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PUSHBACK: TITLE VII
TAKES ON HOBBY LOBBY
Carole Okolowicz*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2014, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,1 the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that three employers with religious objections
to birth control did not have to comply with a portion of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) that required
employers to cover birth control in their employee health plans.2
One of the purposes of the ACA’s contraceptive mandate was to
remedy sex discrimination in the health plan employers offer to their
employees. 3 Congress had found that without birth control
coverage, women pay much more out of pocket for their health care
than men,4 making the plans less valuable to women. Prior to the
enactment of the ACA in 2010, some lower courts had determined
that an employer’s refusal to cover birth control in its otherwise
comprehensive health plan was sex discrimination against female
employees under a different law,5 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.6
In Hobby Lobby, however, the employees were not a party,7 and the
Court did not have to consider their rights. The Court determined,
without hearing from the employees, that its ruling would have no
* I would like to thank the University of San Francisco School of Law
Professor Maria Ontiveros for her guidance and support.
1
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
2
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2010).
3
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2789; Priests for Life v. United States HHS, 772
F.3d 229, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
4
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2788-89.
5
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001);
EEOC v. UPS, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (D. Minn. 2001).
6
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1991).
7
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (noting that parties were the owners of
three corporations and the government.).
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effect on the female employees because birth control would be
covered, albeit not by the employer.8 In its ruling, the Court placed
the employer’s religious rights above female employees’ right to be
treated equally to their male coworkers.
The Hobby Lobby9 case was wrongly decided; in allowing
for-profit employers with religious objections to avoid covering
birth control in their employee health plans, the Court allowed the
employers to discriminate against female workers in their employee
benefits. Female employees should have a cause of action under
Title VII to require their employers to cover birth control regardless
of the employers’ religious views if the plan also covers the health
needs of men.10 This Note analyzes the Title VII claims of female
employees for sex discrimination in this situation. It finds that the
one reason why plaintiffs will be precluded from bringing such
claims is that under the accommodation in Hobby Lobby, there is no
harm to employees, which is a necessary element under Title VII.
However, the harm element could be met depending on the future
of the ACA.
Part II explains the background of this issue, describing the
importance of access to birth control for women, the ACA’s
contraceptive mandate, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”), 11 and the Hobby Lobby ruling and dissent. Part III
begins the Title VII analysis by looking at the two issues facing the
plaintiffs in the prima facie stage: the proper comparator to female
birth control (Part A) and the plaintiffs’ harm (Part B). This section
finds that as the law presently stands Hobby Lobby allows unequal
treatment of female employees, but these employees currently
suffer no material harm. If plaintiffs can prove the prima facie case,
Part IV analyzes the claims under the disparate impact theory (Part
8

Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2760.
See generally, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751 (2014) (holding that the
ACA’s contraceptive mandate violated RFRA, substantially burdening forprofit corporation’s religious objections to contraception, and was not the
least restrictive means).
10
This recommendation does not apply to “ministers” of a church or other
house of worship because those employees are exempted from Title VII. See
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C.,132
U.S. 171, 188-89 (2012) (noting that application of Title VII to ministers
violates the Establishment Clause).
11
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
9
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A) and the disparate treatment theory (Part B). The disparate
treatment claim delves into the religious motives of the employer,
which courts may not question, while disparate impact avoids that
inquiry and is more likely to be successful because of it.
II.

BACKGROUND: BIRTH CONTROL, THE AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT, RFRA, AND HOBBY LOBBY
A. Importance of Birth Control

Birth control is important to women’s preventive health care
needs. First, many women who use birth control use it for reasons
other than preventing pregnancy. Most forms of female birth control
contain hormones and can be used as a hormonal treatment. 12
Fourteen percent of all women using the birth control pill, and onethird of teen users, use it exclusively for non-contraceptive reasons
(58% use it to prevent both a health condition and pregnancy).13
Common non-contraceptive uses include reduction of cramps and
menstrual pain, menstrual regulation, treatment of endometriosis,
and treatment of acne.14 Second, most women use birth control to
prevent unplanned pregnancies, which can have detrimental effects
on a woman’s health.15 For women with certain health conditions,
like diabetes or obesity, pregnancy can worsen their condition.
Using birth control to prevent pregnancy allows these women to
reduce that risk by getting their condition under control first before
12

American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Noncontraceptive Benefits
of
Birth
Control
Pills
(2011),
https://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/Resources/Patient_Re
sources/Fact_Sheets_and_Info_Booklets/Noncontraceptive%20benefits%20
of%20BCP-final_1-5-12.pdf.
13
Rebecca Wind, “Many American Women Use Birth Control Pills for NonContraceptive Reasons: One-third of teen users rely on the pill exclusively
for these purposes”, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (November 15, 2011)
https://www.guttmacher.org/news-release/2011/many-american-womenuse-birth-control-pills-noncontraceptive-reasons.
14
Id.
15
See generally, Institute of Medicine, Inst. of Med., Clinical Preventive
Services
for
Women:
Closing
the
Gap,
102-04
(2011),
https://www.nap.edu/read/13181/chapter/1 [hereinafter IOM].
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becoming pregnant.16 Women with certain other conditions, such as
pulmonary hypertension and cyanotic heart disease, must avoid
pregnancy altogether. 17 Even for healthy women, pregnancy can
involve complications such as gestational diabetes, hypertension,
anemia, and even death.18
Unplanned pregnancy can be detrimental to women in other
important aspects of their lives as well. Women who have
unintended pregnancies are more likely to experience domestic
violence than women whose pregnancies are intended.19 For some
women, having a child could create a financial burden at a time
when the woman and her family cannot shoulder such a burden
without serious detriment.20 Some women may have educational or
professional goals they would like to achieve before devoting their
time and energy to raising a child. By allowing women to control
when they get pregnant, birth control gives them some measure of
control over their lives. The U.S. Supreme Court has said that “[t]he
ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social
life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives.” 21 American women know this; 88% of all
sexually-active women have used or are using birth control.22
16

Priests for Life v. United States HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 262 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(vacated and remanded by Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016)).
17
IOM, supra note 15, at 103.
18
See generally, Pregnancy Complications, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND
PREVENTION
(June
17,
2016),
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/pregcomplicati
ons.htm.
19
IOM, supra note 15, at 103(noting that women with unintended
pregnancies are more likely than those with intended pregnancies to
experience domestic violence during pregnancy).
20
Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 263 (“An unintended pregnancy is virtually
certain to impose substantial, unplanned-for expenses and time demands . . .
[which] fall disproportionately on women.”)
21
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856
(1992).
22
Kimberly Daniels, Ph.D., et al., Contraceptive Methods Women Have Ever
Used: United States, 1982-2010, 62 NAT’L HEALTH STAT. REP. 1 (Feb. 14,
2013), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr062.pdf (noting that 88% of
women have used a female form of birth control in their lifetime and 99%
have used at least one form, including male condoms).
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Studies have found that unintended pregnancies can also
have detrimental effects on the child. 23 Pregnancies that are too
close together can result in low birth weight.24 Women who do not
know they are pregnant may delay prenatal care and may continue
risky behaviors, like smoking or drinking alcohol.25 Use of birth
control helps to prevent unwanted pregnancies and therefore, helps
prevent abortions. In 2001, 42% of all unintended pregnancies in
America ended in abortion.26
Because birth control use is so common, if insurance does
not cover it, women as a class pay more out of pocket for their health
care than men.27
B. The Contraceptive Mandate
In 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act which imposes fines on
employers with fifty or more full-time employees that do not offer
health insurance to their employees.28 The law requires the health
plan to cover preventive treatments and services at no cost to
employees and their dependents, including coverage of all approved
contraceptive drugs and devices. 29 This is what has been termed
“the contraceptive mandate.”30
The initial version of the law required coverage of
preventive services, like vaccines, but did not include the
contraceptive mandate. Congress included preventive services
because it knew that if people took steps to prevent health problems,
the nation’s health would improve and healthcare costs would
23

IOM, supra note 15, at 103.
IOM, supra note 15, at 103.
25
IOM, supra note 15, at 103.
26
IOM, supra note 15, at 103.
27
Priests for Life v. United States HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 263 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(“in general, women of childbearing age spend 68 percent more in out-ofpocket health care costs than men.”) (quoting 155 CONG. REC. 28, 843
(2009)(statement of Sen. Gillbrand).
28
26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(2)(A) (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014).
29
26 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2010).
30
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (using the term “contraceptive mandate”).
24
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drop. 31 Senator Barbara Mikulski noticed that the requirements
ignored the needs of women and introduced the Women’s Health
Amendment, which added “preventive services specific to women’s
health.”32 Sen. Mikulski introduced the amendment in response to
the hurdles women face in getting health insurance coverage for
preventive services particular to women.33 Sen. Mikulski told the
New York Times “[t]he insurance companies take being a woman
as a pre-existing condition. . . . We can’t get health insurance
because of pre-existing conditions called a C-section.”34 The Senate
debate over the amendment focused on coverage of
mammograms. 35 Senator Diane Feinstein noted that without
adequate coverage, “[w]omen of childbearing age spend 68 percent
more in out-of-pocket health care costs than men.” 36 The
amendment aimed at addressing these disparities and improving
women’s health.
After Congress passed the ACA with the Women’s
Amendment, it directed a federal agency, the Health Resources and
Services Administration (“HRSA”), 37 to determine which
“preventive services specific to women’s health” should be covered.
HRSA in turn commissioned a study from the independent Institute
of Medicine (“IOM”). 38 The IOM recommended including
31

Priests for Life v. United States HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 260 (2014).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2788; See also David Herszenhorn & Robert
Pear, Senate Passes Women’s Health Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (December 3,
2009),
https://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/senate-passeswomens-health-amendment/.
33
David Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Senate Passes Women’s Health
Amendment,
ɴ.ʏ.
ᴛɪᴍᴇs
(December
3,
2009),
https://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/senate-passes-womenshealth-amendment/.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2788.
37
The HRSA is a component of the Department of Health and Human
Resources. Bureaus and Offices, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES
ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.hrsa.gov/about/organization/bureaus/index.html (last visited
Mar. 5, 2017).
38
Priests for Life v. United States HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 260 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
32
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contraception with the other covered preventive services because
numerous studies showed the detrimental effect unplanned
pregnancies can have on women’s physical health, as well as other
aspects of women’s lives. 39 HRSA adopted the IOM’s
recommendations, concluding that because of women’s
reproductive health needs and the significant costs involved, the
ACA’s preventive services requirement should include
contraceptive coverage. 40 The government found that when
employers do not cover the preventive services needs of women,
including contraception, the resulting disparity “placed women in
the workforce at a disadvantage compared to their male
coworkers.”41
Almost immediately, employers with religious objections to
contraception began disputing the requirement and there was a
powerful law to assist them in those claims – the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993.
C. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion].” 42 In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Smith that
under the Free Exercise Clause, if Congress makes a law that is
“neutral” and “generally applicable,” all people must abide by it
even if it infringes on their religious beliefs.43
Congress disagreed. In 1993, in a direct response to Smith,
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”),44 which created greater protection for religious rights
when a neutral law infringes on a person’s religious beliefs. Under
RFRA, a person is relieved of complying with a neutral law of
general applicability if doing so “substantially burden[s]” her
exercise of her religion, unless the government can show that it has
39

See supra, Part II.A.; IOM, supra note 15, at 102-04.
Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 261.
41
77 Fed. Reg. 8725.
42
U.S. Const. amend. I.
43
Emp’t Div. Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
44
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
40

OKOLOWICZ: PUSHBACK: TITLE VII TAKES ON HOBBY LOBBY

104

DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GEN & LAW

[Vol. VII: II

a compelling interest in the law and the law is the least restrictive
means of achieving that interest.45 If the religious person proves her
case and the government cannot meet this high burden of proof, the
person is exempt from the law.
Many of the RFRA claims in the employment context have
been brought by employees against their government employers.46
The bulk of the cases in which employers sought RFRA’s protection
have been against the ACA’s contraceptive mandate. However,
employers have brought claims against other laws, notably antidiscrimination laws. 47 Prior to RFRA’s enactment, employers
brought free exercise claims against laws involving minimum wage
and equal pay for women. 48 Those claims were not successful
because under Smith, the two laws are “neutral laws of general
applicability,” so the employers were not successful.
There is nothing in the statutory text of RFRA that requires
consideration of the effect that such an exemption would have on
third parties, such as the employees.
D. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,49 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that RFRA protects not only an individual’s right to
45

Id. at § 2000bb-(1)(b).
See Holly v. Jewell, 196 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (discussing that
a National Park Service employee alleged the employer discriminated on the
basis of his religion); Tagore v. U.S., 735 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing
that an IRS employee alleged employer’s policy of no blades discriminated
against her Sikh religion); Francis v. Mineta, 505 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2007)
(discussing that a National Transportation Administration employee alleged
the employer discriminated on basis of his religion when he was fired for
wearing dreadlocks).
47
See E.E.O.C. v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., No. 14-13710,
2016 WL 4396083 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2016) (on appeal) (holding
compliance with Title VII to allow transgender employee to wear a skirt
imposed a substantial burden on employer’s religious beliefs under RFRA).
48
Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985)
(minimum wage); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1392
(4th Cir. 1990) (equal pay).
49
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
46
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practice his or her religion but also a for-profit corporation’s right
to practice its religion.50 In Hobby Lobby, three corporations, Hobby
Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel, claimed that the contraceptive
mandate infringed on the exercise of their religion by forcing them
to cover birth control51 in their employee health plans, the use of
which they believe to be a sin.52 The Court agreed and allowed them
an accommodation from the law, one that the ACA already had in
place for nonprofit corporations. 53 If the corporation notifies the
government of its religious objections to contraceptives, the
government will tell the corporation’s insurance provider to exclude
birth control coverage under the company’s health plan. 54 The
insurer then will pay for contraception “without imposing any costsharing requirements on the [corporation], the group health plan, or
plan participants or beneficiaries.”55 Justice Alito, writing for the
majority in Hobby Lobby, determined that the effect of this
accommodation on the female employees would be “precisely zero”
because contraceptives would be covered.56
In holding that the corporations’ religious rights were
burdened, the majority noted that a corporation is a fictional legal
entity that does not itself have religious beliefs. 57 Corporations,
wrote Justice Alito, are essentially “the human beings who own,
run, and are employed by them.”58 But somehow, the right to the
50

Id. at 2775.
Id. at 2764-65 (discussing that the owners of the three corporations had
objections only to four of the forms of birth control they were required to
cover which they called “abortifacients,” or like an abortion. The four forms
included intrauterine devices (“IUDs”) and emergency contraception (also
called the “morning after” pill). The owners believe that life begins at
conception. Since these four devices or pills may operate to block a fertilized
egg from growing, the owners believe they are abortion-like).
52
Id. at 2764-65.
53
45 C.F.R. § 147.131; Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782.
54
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751. See also Priests for Life v. United States
HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 236 (2014).
55
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
56
Id. at 2782.
57
Id. at 2768.
58
Id.
51
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free exercise of religion belongs only to “the humans who own and
control” the corporation. 59 The Hobby Lobby claims were only
brought by those who “own and control” the plaintiff corporations,
not the employees or managers. The owners sued the government
for infringing on their personal religious beliefs and the employees
were not a party. Accordingly, the Court only had to consider the
law’s impact on the owners, not on the employees.60
Not only did the majority opinion fail to consider whether
the employees agreed with their employer’s beliefs, it only
fleetingly considered what effect abiding by those beliefs would
have on the employees. The government had argued that RFRA
must not be used to allow an employer with religious beliefs to
avoid laws intended to benefit employees, such as minimum wage
laws, anti-discrimination laws, and laws regulating employee health
insurance benefits, because the benefits conferred are not so much
gifts as they are the employees’ rights.61 It argued that employee
health insurance in particular is part of the employee’s
compensation. 62 Justice Alito disregarded that argument and held
that the contraceptive mandate confers a benefit on employees and
when a law confers a benefit on third parties, as opposed to relieving
a burden, courts could exempt the employer from the law.63 Justice
Alito did not consider the contraceptive mandate’s role in relieving
a burden, that is, the inequality in the health plans offered to male
and female employees, as was well-documented by Congress.64
E. The Hobby Lobby Dissent
The central focus of the four-Justice dissent in Hobby Lobby
was the rights of the female employees. 65 Justice Ginsburg, in
dissent, wrote that “[t]he exemption sought by Hobby Lobby and
59

Id.
Id. at 2769.
61
Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 15, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 1536 (2014) (No. 13-354).
62
Id.
63
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781, n.37.
64
Priests for Life v. United States HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 262-64 (2014).
65
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2790-91.
60
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Conestoga would override significant interests of the corporations’
employees and covered dependents.”66 Justice Ginsburg noted that
in no prior decision had RFRA allowed an exemption from a neutral
law when allowing the exemption would be harmful to the very
people the law was meant to protect. 67 She wrote that RFRA’s
requirement that the government’s action must be the “least
restrictive means” cannot be satisfied by taking away employees’
legal benefits so that their commercial employers can adhere to their
own personal religious beliefs.68
The dissent provides a powerful argument for why no
commercial employer should be able to avoid laws intended to
protect employees due to the employer’s religious objections. But
the Hobby Lobby case provides an interesting twist. Unlike a
minimum wage law which is designed to protect all employees, the
contraceptive mandate was specifically designed to protect women.
Justice Ginsburg explained that the mandate’s purposes were to
correct “the disproportionate burden women carried for
comprehensive health services and the adverse health
consequences” that women suffer when contraception is not
covered.69 Because the mandate was designed to address inequality
based on a protected characteristic – sex – the Hobby Lobby ruling
triggers Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 70 which prohibits
employment discrimination. The question is whether this claim can
succeed.
III.

THE PRIMA FACIE CASE: IS THERE DISCRIMINATION?

Justice Kennedy and the four Justices in dissent, confirmed
that the government’s interest in “protect[ing] the health of female
employees” was a “compelling interest,” as required under RFRA.71
66

Id.
Id. at 2801.
68
Id. at 2802.
69
Id. at 2789 (emphasis added).
70
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991).
71
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (confirming
that the government had shown that it had a compelling interest in “providing
insurance coverage that is necessary to protect the health of female
67
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Even the majority opinion, which assumed without deciding that the
government had a compelling interest, noted that the contraceptive
mandate concerned women,72 not employees in general.
Title VII prohibits discrimination in “compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of [the
employee’s] . . . sex.”73 “Health insurance and other fringe benefits
are ‘compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.’”74 Ultimately, it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove that
the employer discriminated “because of” sex.75 If the plaintiff can
make out an initial, prima facie case of discrimination, the employer
will have a chance to rebut.76 If the plaintiff cannot make that initial
showing, the case ends there.
Under Title VII, there are generally two theories of
discrimination: disparate treatment and disparate impact. 77 A
disparate treatment claim argues that the employer intentionally
treated an individual or group of employees worse than others
because of the employee’s protected characteristic. 78 In contrast,
disparate impact claims concern “employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified
by business necessity.”79
employees” and that such coverage was “significantly more costly [for
females] than for a male employee.”); See also id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (noting there is a compelling interest in protecting “women’s wellbeing”).
72
Id. at 2760 (noting that “[t]he effect of the . . . accommodation on the
women employed by Hobby Lobby. . .”); id. at 2782 (noting that “[t]he
principal dissent identifies no reason why this accommodation would fail to
protect the asserted needs of women . . . . Under the accommodation, the
plaintiff’s female employees would continue to receive contraceptive
coverage . . . .”).
73
§ 2000e-2(a)(1).
74
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669,
682 (1983).
75
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
76
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
77
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335, n.15.
78
Id.
79
Id.
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To make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment, a
plaintiff must show that “(1) [s]he belongs to a protected class, (2)
[s]he was subjected to an adverse job action; (3) [her] employer
treated similarly situated employees outside [her] protected class
more favorably; and (4) [s]he was qualified to do the job.” 80 To
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, the plaintiff must
prove that a specific employment policy or practice causes a
significant disparate impact on a group of employees who share
plaintiff’s protected characteristic.81
Under both claims, plaintiffs alleging sex discrimination by
their Hobby Lobby-like employer will face two main issues in
proving their prima facie case. Ultimately, plaintiffs must show that
the employer treated them worse than it treated other similarlysituated employees because of their sex. This involves finding a
proper, similarly-situated comparator against which to compare the
employer’s treatment of the plaintiffs, and proving that the plaintiffs
actually were treated worse by showing they suffered a harm.
A. Comparator: What is the male equivalent to birth
control pills?
In a disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff who has no direct
evidence that her employer discriminated against her because she is
a woman can nonetheless create an inference of sex discrimination
by comparing the employer’s treatment of her to its treatment of a
similarly situated male coworker. 82 In a disparate impact claim,
plaintiffs must show that the employer’s practices “fall more
harshly on one group” as compared to another. 83 In both cases,
plaintiffs have the burden to prove that the group of coworkers to
which they compare themselves is similar enough to the plaintiffs
80

1 BARBARA LINDEMANN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 2-18
(5th ed. 2012); Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., 330 F.3d 1313, 1316
(11th Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
801 (1973)).
81
1 BARBARA LINDEMANN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 3-16
(5th ed. 2012).
82
Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011).
83
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335, n.15.
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so that a factfinder may infer discriminatory animus by the
employer.
In deciding whether a health plan discriminates on the basis
of sex, courts may consider whether the health plan excludes a
treatment for women but covers a similar treatment for men.84 The
issue here is what male treatment is similar to female prescription
birth control. This is not a simple task – the forms of male birth
control are substantially different from female birth control, both in
how they prevent pregnancy and in their subsequent effects, as men
cannot get pregnant.
There is a circuit split as to how similar comparators must
be to a plaintiff, with some circuits holding they must be “nearly
identical,”85 while other circuits hold they need only be similar “in
all material respects.” 86 Regardless, the purpose of making the
comparison is “to eliminate other possible explanatory variables [in
order to] isolate the critical independent variable - discriminatory
animus.” 87 The differences between the plaintiff and the
comparators may not be “so significant that they render the
comparison effectively useless.”88
Few federal courts have decided the issue of whether
exclusion of contraception from an employee health plan is sex
discrimination under Title VII and what the proper comparator is.89
84

Standridge v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. (In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t. Practices
Litig.), 479 F.3d 936, 944 (8th Cir. 2007).
85
Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 221 (5th Cir. 2001); Trask
v. Sec’y Dep’t. of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179, 1192 (11th Cir. 2016);
Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1514 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
86
Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012); Graham v. Long
Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000); Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 353 (6th Cir. 1998); Nicholson v. Hyannis Air
Serv., Inc., 580 F.3d 1116, 1125 (9th Cir. 2009).
87
Coleman, 667 F.3d at 846 (citations omitted).
88
Id. at 846.
89
In prior cases on this issue (see supra note 80), many of the plaintiffs
brought claims under Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (“PDA”) for discrimination based on the ability to get pregnant. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k). This paper will not discuss the dispute over whether the
PDA applies to contraception and will focus on Title VII without the PDA.
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To date, there are only two relevant cases that are published,
reported, and still good law.90 In Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.,91 a
federal district court in Washington held that the employer’s
exclusion of contraceptives was sex discrimination.92 However, in
In re Union Pac. R.R. Empl. Practices Litig.,93 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that it was not.94 The remaining cases are
either unreported or fall under Eighth Circuit precedent.95 Most of
the courts that have dealt with this issue have used one of two
comparators: male contraception or preventive treatment.96
1. Male Contraception
A few courts, including the Eighth Circuit, have held that
health plans that exclude both male and female contraception are
gender-neutral, because male contraception is the proper
comparator to female contraception. 97 In Union Pacific, the
90

Standridge v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. (In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t. Practices
Litig.), 479 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2007); Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F.
Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
91
Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266.
92
Id. at 1272.
93
Union Pacific, 479 F.3d at 944.
94
Id.
95
Cooley v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 979 (E.D. Mo. 2003)
(falling under Eighth Circuit precedent); Alexander v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No.
4:02-CV-0252-A, 2002 WL 731815 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2002); Cummins v.
State, No. 2002-cv-4201-JPG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42634 (S.D. Ill. Aug.
30, 2005); Stocking v. AT&T Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (W.D. Mo. 2006),
vacated, Stocking v. AT&T Corp., No. 03-0421-CV-W-HFS, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 78188 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 22, 2007); Wright v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,
No. 4:03CV1843 CDP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42366 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10,
2005) (falling under Eighth Circuit precedent).
96
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 (W.D. Wash.
2001) (holding that the comparison should be with preventive drugs, as well
as prescription contraceptives); UPS, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1217, 1219 (holding
that since the employee’s wife took birth control pills for hormone regulation,
the comparison should be with male hormonal treatments.).
97
Standridge v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. (In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t. Practices
Litig.), 479 F.3d 936, 944 (8th Cir. 2007); Cummins, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
42634, at *23-25; Alexander, 2002 WL 731815, at *6.
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employer’s health plan excluded male and female birth control
“when used for the sole purpose of contraception” but did cover
female birth control when used for non-contraceptive reasons such
as “regulating menstrual cycles, treating skin problems or avoiding
serious health risks associated with pregnancy.”98 A class of female
employees who used birth control for contraceptive purposes
brought a lawsuit against their employer. In determining whether
the plan provided worse coverage to females as compared to males,
the Eighth Circuit held that male forms of contraception, such as
condoms and vasectomies, are similar in all relevant respects to
female forms, such as birth control pills, “sponges, diaphragms,
intrauterine devices, [and] tubal ligation” because they provide the
same benefit: prevention of pregnancy.99
The federal district court in Cummins v. State similarly held
that a plan was gender-neutral when it excluded all non-surgical
contraception100 because male and female contraception both stop
conception.101 The court took on a removed, academic tone when
explaining that although conception only takes place inside a
woman’s body, “the process clearly requires the participation of
both males and females and, critically, the process may therefore be
prevented by either the male or the female, each of whom is
consequently equally affected by the exclusion at issue in this
case.”102
The Union Pacific and Cummins courts were wrong; male
birth control is not similar enough to female birth control to make a
proper comparator. The two decisions rest on the assumption that
the prevention of pregnancy equally affects men and women, which
presumes that pregnancy equally affects men and women. But that
assumption simply is not true. For men, contraception does not
address a health care need; their bodies will never become pregnant.
For men, preventing pregnancy will ensure that a man does not have
98

Union Pacific, 479 F.3d at 938.
Id. at 944.
100
Cummins, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42634, at *2 (noting the health plan
covered vasectomies and tubal ligations, surgical sterilization for men and
women respectively).
101
Cummins, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42634, at *25.
102
Id. at *24-25.
99
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to raise another child. For women, in addition to not having to raise
another child, preventing pregnancy will ensure that a woman’s
body will not undergo the changes and stress that may negatively
affect her health.103 This distinction is important in the context of an
employee health plan. The proper comparison should be between
treatments for similar health care needs that could be covered by
health insurance.
Birth control for men presently takes two forms: condoms
and vasectomies. In addition to the argument above, condoms are
not a good comparator to female birth control because they are
available without a prescription. Health insurance plans generally
do not cover non-prescription drugs or devices, like condoms. For
example, Medicare does not cover non-prescription medicines.104
By contrast, most female forms of birth control require a
prescription. Birth control pills, IUDs, implants, and even
diaphragms require a visit to the doctor and the pharmacy in order
to access them.105 The dissent in Union Pacific noted that condoms
were not a good comparator because the employer had not identified
“any health insurance policy which would provide coverage for
non-prescription, contraceptive devices available in drug stores and
gas stations nationwide.” 106 The purpose of comparing similar
103

Stocking v. AT&T Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1017 (W.D. Mo. 2006),
vacated, Stocking v. AT&T Corp., No. 03-0421-CV-W-HFS, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 78188 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 22, 2007) (judgment vacated following Union
Pacific ruling) (noting that contraception has “a major social significance for
men but avoidance of pregnancy has both social and physical significance for
women.”).
104
Joseph Matthews, Services Not Covered by Medicare Part B, NOLO,
(http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/services-not-covered-medicarepart-b.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2016).
105
FDA News Release, FDA approves Plan B One-Step emergency
contraception for use without a prescription for all women of child-bearing
potential, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION (June 20, 2013),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm3580
82.htm (discussing that one notable exception is emergency contraception,
which the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approved for sale without
a prescription in 2013).
106
Standridge v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. (In re Union Pac. R.R, Emp’t. Practices
Litig.), 479 F.3d 936, 945 (8th Cir. 2007).
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treatments is to “eliminate other explanatory variables.” 107 The
explanation of why an employer would exclude condoms from
coverage is simple; non-prescription condoms are never covered by
health insurance.
The second form of male birth control previously discussed
is vasectomies. Vasectomies are also not similar enough “in all
relevant respects” to female birth control to allow for a meaningful
comparison. Vasectomies are permanent, surgical forms of birth
control.108 If the dispute was over an employer’s exclusion of tubal
ligations, the female permanent, surgical form of birth control,
perhaps comparing the employer’s treatment of vasectomies would
be apt.109 But the dispute in Hobby Lobby was only over reversible,
non-surgical forms of female birth control. Permanent birth control
is much different than reversible forms for several reasons. First,
vasectomies are a form of surgery. An employer could decide not to
cover a type of surgery for reasons that would not apply to pills or
IUDs, such as cost. Second, vasectomies are permanent. An
employer could decide to cover a permanent form of birth control
because it may be more cost effective than a temporary form.
If the basis of the comparison is the medical effect of birth
control, vasectomies still do not make good comparators to
reversible forms of contraception used by women. The medical

107

Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012).
Contraception: Permanent Methods of Birth Control, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
AND
PREVENTION
(June
21,
2016),
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/contraception/index.htm (noting that
“sterilization is a permanent, safe, and highly effective approach for birth
control,” and that although most who undergo sterilization “do not regret
having had the procedure, the permanence of the method is an important
consideration, as regret has been documented in studies.”).
109
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765-66 (2014)
(noting that the employers objected to two IUDs and two forms of
emergency contraception known as “morning after” pills); Contraception:
Permanent Methods of Birth Control, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION (June 21, 2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/contraception//index.htm (noting
IUDs and “morning after” pills are reversible).
108
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effect of a vasectomy is permanent sterilization. 110 Men get
vasectomies when they are either done having children or have
decided not to have them.111 That is quite different from the medical
effect of reversible forms of female birth control, which allow
women to choose to have children by stopping use of the birth
control. This is important for women who want to have children but
must get a medical condition under control before their bodies are
safe for pregnancy. Men do not have to worry if their bodies will be
safe for childbirth when deciding to father a child.
2. Preventive Treatments
Other courts have used preventive drugs and devices as a
comparator, since the function of birth control is the prevention of
pregnancy and related health risks. In Erickson, the court held that
an employer’s health plan discriminated against women because it
excluded contraception but covered many preventive drugs.112 The
employer argued that birth control is different from preventive
drugs because of what they prevent; the covered drugs prevent
diseases but pregnancy is not a disease and contraceptive use is
voluntary.113 But the court held that the function of birth control and
the covered drugs was the same: although pregnancy is a natural
state, not a disease, it is “not a state that is desired by all women or
at all points in a woman’s life.”114 It found that birth control, like
the other preventive drugs, helps its user avoid certain “health
consequences,” like “unwanted physical changes” associated with
pregnancy, as well as emotional, economic, and social
consequences. 115 The comparison between preventive drugs and
birth control allows the court to “eliminate other explanatory
110

Contraception: Permanent Methods of Birth Control, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
AND
PREVENTION
(June
21,
2016),
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/contraception/index.htm.
111
Id.
112
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
113
Id. at 1272
114
Id. at 1273.
115
Id.
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variables” and focus on how the employer regards women’s health
needs.116
In Union Pacific, the lower court had chosen as a
comparator treatments “that prevent employees from developing
diseases or conditions that pose an equal or lesser threat to
employees’ health than does pregnancy.”117 The majority explicitly
disagreed with this comparator without explanation.118
3. Proper Comparators: Preventive Treatments
The proper comparator that courts should use when deciding
if exclusion of birth control is discriminatory is preventive
treatments, as they serve the same functions. In addition to the
arguments discussed above, the argument that birth control is
similar to other preventive treatments has ample support in the ACA
and Hobby Lobby. The ACA itself treats birth control as a
preventive treatment, as both the Hobby Lobby majority and dissent
note. 119 The majority explained that the mandate is part of the
“Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines,” which includes not
only coverage of contraception but also screening and testing
services.120
Further, birth control can prevent the worsening of certain
health conditions and the onset of other, more common pregnancyrelated health risks. The CDC lists several other complications
associated with pregnancy, including high blood pressure,
gestational diabetes, depression, preeclampsia, and anemia. 121
116

Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012).
Standridge v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. (In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t. Practices
Litig.), 479 F.3d 936, 944 (8th Cir. 2007).
118
Id., n.5.
119
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762-63 (2014);
see also Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2788 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
120
Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”), Women’s
Preventive Services Guidelines, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/
(last visited Dec. 1, 2016).
121
Pregnancy Complications, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION
(June
17,
2016),
http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/pregcomplicati
ons.htm.
117
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Thus, to counter the employer’s argument in Erickson that birth
control use is voluntary, it is not voluntary for all women, just as
preventive treatment is not mandatory for everyone.
B. Harm
A prima facie case of either disparate treatment or disparate
impact requires a plaintiff to show that the employer’s action
affected her adversely.122 An employment action is adverse under
Title VII if it “materially affects the compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.” 123 It has also been
defined as “a significant change in employment status, such as . . .
a decision causing significant change in benefits.” 124 But “not
everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable
adverse action.”125 Discriminatory acts by employers that are not
adverse “fail as a matter of law.”126
In the prior Title VII birth control cases, 127 which all
occurred before the contraceptive mandate, the plaintiffs did not
face a problem proving that there was an adverse employment
action because the employer’s exclusion of birth control “materially
affected” the value of their health plan. Like the male employees,
the female employees were given health insurance as a benefit to
their employment, but that benefit was worth less to female

122

Perry v. Donovan, 733 F. Supp. 2d 114, 119 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
that giving employee a disproportionate amount of dangerous and strenuous
work was an adverse employment action; giving her gloves and vest of only
slightly inferior quality were not adverse actions).
124
Perry, 733 F. Supp. 2d 114 (holding that failure to allow employee to
compete for a promotion which would have increased her salary was an
adverse employment action).
125
Smart v Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
adverse actions must affect the terms and conditions of employment but that
negative evaluations, without more, are not adverse employment actions).
126
Id.
127
See supra Part II.A.
123
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employees than to males because females had to pay out of pocket
for birth control prescriptions.128
With the ACA’s contraceptive mandate and the Hobby
Lobby ruling, however, a for-profit employer’s decision not to cover
birth control for religious reasons does not mean that the employee
has to pay full price. Under the accommodation devised in Hobby
Lobby, “female employees would continue to receive contraceptive
coverage without cost sharing for all FDA-approved contraceptives,
and they would continue to face minimal logistical and
administrative obstacles because their employers’ insurers would be
responsible for providing information and coverage.”129 The only
difference between the plan’s coverage of birth control and its
coverage of other drugs or devices, from the female employees’
perspective, is that they will know that their employer has played no
role in providing contraceptive coverage.130 Plaintiffs could argue
that that is a “significant change in benefits,” but it is not one that
“materially affects” them. Without a material harm, there is no
claim.
When analyzing the adverse employment action, courts
should address what the employer provides to its employees, not
what employees obtain by other means. For example, if an employer
offers health insurance only to its male employees but not to its
female employees, the employer should not be able to satisfy its
legal obligations under Title VII by arguing that its choice was nondiscriminatory because its female employees get insurance through
their husbands’ employers. Likewise, Title VII should analyze what
the employer provides to the employee, not what the insurer pays
for and provides under the Hobby Lobby arrangement.
1. Zubik v. Burwell
The hypothetical above foreshadows one development of
the law in this area. While Hobby Lobby was being decided by the
Court, employers with religious objections to birth control
128

Mauldin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. Civ.A.1:01-CV2755-JEC, 2002
WL 2022334, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 23, 2002).
129
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2782 (2014).
130
Priests for Life v. United States HHS, 772 F.3d 229, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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continued to demand that they be released from having any
involvement in the provision of birth control coverage to their
employees. The next wave of cases was brought by religious
nonprofits that argued that the accommodation itself unlawfully
burdened their religious exercise under RFRA.131 These cases are
important because the more detached the Court allows employers to
become from the provision of their employees’ birth control
coverage, the better the argument is that the employer is not actually
providing the birth control coverage and therefore, the health plan
the employer provides discriminates against women. Additionally,
the majority opinion in Hobby Lobby stated that for-profit
corporations should be treated the same as nonprofits in terms of
accommodating their religious beliefs, 132 which means that the
Court’s decision regarding nonprofits will eventually be extended
to for-profits corporations and organizations.
On May 16, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling in
Zubik v. Burwell,133 a consolidation of seven cases dealing with the
same issue. The plaintiffs were several religious nonprofits,
Catholic colleges and charity organizations that were allowed an
accommodation under the ACA.134 The nonprofits argued that the
religious accommodation under the ACA forces them to perform an
action (notifying the government of their religious objections) that
triggers birth control coverage, which makes them complicit in the
sin of facilitating birth control use. 135 The plaintiff employers
wanted to be released from having any connection to the provision
of birth control in their employee health plan.
The Court ultimately did not make a decision in Zubik on
the merits of the case.136 Instead, it asked the employers and the
government to work out a deal on their own. 137 The nonprofit
131

Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
133
Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1557
134
Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 236. Priests for Life was one of the cases that
was consolidated into Zubik v. Burwell when the Court granted certiorari.
135
Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 236.
136
Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1560.
137
Id. (holding that “the parties on remand should be afforded an opportunity
to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners'
religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by
132
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employers said that they would not feel their religious exercise was
infringed if they could purchase a plan for their employees that did
not include birth control coverage.138 The government said that it
could modify the existing accommodation in such a way that the
employer would not have to notify the government and the
government could still ensure that contraceptive coverage was
provided. 139 Under this scheme, the employer is not actually
providing contraceptive coverage; the insurer is providing it. While
there still may be an issue of harm, there is a stronger argument
under these cases that the employer is providing unequal benefits to
its employees because of their sex.
2. New Administration
Another, more dramatic change may take place regarding
this area of the law with the recent change in governmental
administration. On January 20, 2017, Donald Trump became the
45th President of the United States. 140 Additionally, Republicans
currently hold the majority in both the House of Representatives and
the Senate.141 The fate of the ACA and the contraceptive mandate
is unknown under this administration. Mr. Trump and the
Republican members of Congress have vowed to “repeal and
replace” the ACA but to date, they have not been successful.142
petitioners' health plans ‘receive full and equal health coverage, including
contraceptive coverage.’”).
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Peter Baker and Michael D. Shear, Donald Trump is Sworn In as
President, Capping His Swift Assent, N.Y. TIMES (January 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/20/us/politics/trump-inaugurationday.html?_r=0.
141
United States Senate Press Gallery, 115th Congress: Party Lineup, (January
3, 2017), https://www.dailypress.senate.gov/?page_id=228 (noting 52
Republican Senators, 46 Democrats, 2 Independents); United States House of
Representatives Press Gallery, Party Breakdown, 115th Congress, (April 25,
2017), https://pressgallery.house.gov/member-data/party-breakdown (noting
238 Republicans, 193 Democrats, 4 vacancies).
142
On May 4, 2017, the House passed a healthcare bill to repeal the ACA,
which would not repeal the contraceptive mandate. Thomas Kaplan and
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If the new administration repeals the contraceptive mandate,
there will be no need for Hobby Lobby’s accommodation
mechanism; employers will be free to exclude contraception in
health plans for any reason, unless a state law applies.143 The main
obstacle to the Title VII claim in this Note is the lack of harm
because Hobby Lobby requires contraceptive coverage by the
insurer, if not the employer.144 But if that requirement is repealed
and employees have to pay out of pocket, they will suffer a material
harm, and will have a viable claim under Title VII.
IV.

DISPARATE IMPACT AND DISPARATE TREATMENT

If plaintiffs can prove their prima facie case of
discrimination, then the claim proceeds to the next phase in the
Robert Pear, House Passes Measure to Repeal and Replace Affordable Care
Act, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2017); Timothy Jost, Executive Order Addresses
Religious Objections to Contraception, HEALTHAFFAIRSBLOG (May 5,
2017), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2017/05/05/executive-order-addressesreligious-objections-to-contraception/ (explaining that the House’s healthcare
bill, the American Health Care Act, does not repeal the contraceptive
mandate).Also on May 4, 2017, the President issued an Executive Order, in
part directing the Secretary of Health and Human Services and other agency
heads to “consider issuing amended regulations to address” religious
objections to the contraceptive mandate. Presidential Executive Order
Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty, Sec. 3, 2017 WL 1734772,
(May 4, 2017); Timothy Jost, an emeritus professor at Washington and Lee
University School of Law, wrote that “HHS could, through notice and
rulemaking” remove contraceptives from the list of preventive services
insurers must cover, but that that would be “politically and legally risky.”
Timothy Jost, Executive Order Addresses Religious Objections to
Contraception,
HEALTHAFFAIRSBLOG
(May
5,
2017),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2017/05/05/executive-order-addressesreligious-objections-to-contraception/.
143
Kara Loewentheil, The Satanic Temple, Scott Walker, and Contraception:
A Partial Account of Hobby Lobby’s Implications for State Law, 9 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 89, 98-101 (2015) (explaining that most states have
contraceptive equity laws requiring insurance companies, and possibly
employers, to cover contraceptives but that many also allow a religious
exemption from the law); see also Jost, supra note 142 (noting that 28 states
require insurers to offer women contraceptive coverage).
144
See supra Part II.B.
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litigation. This section analyzes both the disparate impact and the
disparate treatment causes of action, since most of the plaintiffs in
the prior cases brought their case under both.145 Part A analyzes the
disparate impact cause of action first, because that claim avoids
inquiry into the employer’s religious motive, and Part B considers
the disparate treatment claim.
A. Disparate Impact
Once plaintiffs have proven the prima facie case of disparate
impact, that the employer’s exclusion of birth control from the
health plan caused an adverse impact on female employees, the
employer can escape liability only if it proves that its action was
“job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity.” 146 The employer has the burden to persuade the
factfinder of this.147 Courts have interpreted “business necessity” to
mean “necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the
business.”148
An employer could argue, for example, that it excluded birth
control from its health plan to control costs, which businesses must
be permitted to do. 149 In Erickson, the court held that while an
employer may take measures to control costs, it may not do so in a
discriminatory manner.150 Hobby Lobby could argue that excluding
contraception is consistent with business necessity because the
purpose of its business is to “[h]onor[] the Lord” by “operating the

145

EEOC v. UPS, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (Minn. 2001); Erickson v.
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company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.”151 But
that is not related in any way “to the safe and efficient operation of
the business.”152
In summary, if plaintiff employees can prove a prima facie
case of disparate impact, the claim will be successful because the
employer will not be able to show that the policy of excluding
contraception is consistent with business necessity.
B. Disparate Treatment
The prima facie case of disparate treatment is similar to the
prima facie claim of disparate impact. As noted above, a plaintiff
must show that “(1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was
subjected to an adverse job action; (3) the employer treated similarly
situated employees outside her protected class more favorably; and
(4) she was qualified to do the job.”153 If the plaintiff can prove that
she suffered an adverse job action, 154 and, that she was treated
unequally, 155 she can prove a prima facie case because she can
easily meet the remainder of the requirements, as she is a woman,
and for the sake of argument, she is qualified for her job.
1. Employer’s Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory
Reason
After a plaintiff proves her prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the employer to prove that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for taking the action it took.156 This is a light
burden as it is a burden of production, not persuasion.157 All the
employer has to produce is an affidavit from the business owners,
explaining their religious beliefs about contraception. The employer
may also produce a copy of the notice it submitted to the
151
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government, explaining the reason for requesting the
accommodation.158 The employer can easily meet this burden.
2. Pretext
Upon producing an affidavit or notice submitted to the
government, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the employer’s purported
reason for the action is pretextual.159 The employees can succeed at
this stage by showing that the employer’s reason is “unworthy of
credence” or “that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer.”160
When the employer asserts a religious reason for its action,
the plaintiff may not question whether the religious reason is
“plausible in the sense that it is reasonably or validly held.” 161
However, courts have held that plaintiffs can inquire as to whether
that reason is the real reason that motivated the action. 162 When
analyzing whether a religious reason is pretextual, courts should
look at “factual questions such as . . . whether the rule applied to the
plaintiff has been applied evenly.”163 In Redhead v. Conference of
Seventh Day Adventists, the court found that although it accepted
that the employer’s reason for firing a pregnant, unmarried teacher
was honestly based on its religious beliefs forbidding sex outside of
marriage, the court could still inquire as to whether or not the
employer applied that belief equally to its male and female
employees.164
In the legal situation addressed here, the issue is whether the
employer applied its belief that contraception is a sin to both men
and women in its healthcare plan. As previously noted, it is difficult
to determine whether the employer intentionally discriminated
158
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because there is no prescription male birth control that it could have
also excluded. It may be relevant to consider if the employer also
excluded vasectomies because that is the only form of male birth
control it could affirmatively exclude,165 although vasectomies are
not equivalent to female birth control. 166 In the case of Hobby
Lobby, it is especially difficult to make this inquiry because the
employers’ legitimate reason is based on their religious beliefs
about conception, 167 which only takes place inside a woman’s
body. 168 Unlike in Redhead, where men could also violate the
employer’s prohibition on sex outside of marriage, only women can
use prescription birth control so only they can be targeted by the
employer’s beliefs. This is another reason why preventive
treatments are a better comparator than male birth control.
3.

Mixed Motive

A mixed motive case is one in which the plaintiffs have
proven that the employer’s consideration of their sex played a
“motivating part”169 in its decision, even though the employer has
shown that it was legitimately motivated by its religious beliefs.
One way to prove that sex played a “motivating part” in the decision
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is by showing that the employer systematically treated female
employees worse than male employees.170
Under Title VII, a plaintiff will prevail in a mixed motives
case and get full damages unless the employer can prove that it
would have made the same decision regardless of the discriminatory
motive. 171 If the employer proves this, the plaintiffs may still
prevail, but the remedies available will be limited. 172 The
employer’s burden is one of persuasion, not simply of production.173
Even if the court agrees that the employer considered both
its religious beliefs and its employees’ sex in its decision, and even
if the employer can prove it would have made the same decision
regardless, plaintiffs may still prevail. They would still have access
to injunctive relief, meaning they could require their employers to
comply with the contraceptive mandate and cover birth control.
V.

CONCLUSION

Title VII provides legal protection from employment
discrimination on the basis of sex but it is not the only law that fights
sex discrimination in the workplace. The ACA’s contraceptive
mandate remedies inequality in employee health insurance plans by
requiring equal coverage for female healthcare needs. Without birth
control coverage, the employee health plan is worth less to female
employees than to males. In Hobby Lobby, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court allowed three employers to avoid complying with
the contraceptive mandate because of their religious objections to
contraception, a treatment so common that 88% of American
women have used it in their lifetime.174 The Court did not consider
that the employer would be discriminating against its female
employees by allowing this. Title VII should be able to remedy this
discrimination.
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While it is fortunate that the ACA requires contraceptive
coverage so that female employees suffer no loss of benefits, it is
unfortunate that this allows the employer with religious objections
to discriminate against its female employees. But changes are
imminent and female employees may suffer a loss of benefits if the
new administration takes action. If and when that happens, Title VII
must once again stand up for women’s rights in the workplace.

